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Abstract
As the title indicates, the purpose of this Article is to reflect on the manner in which the South
African Constitutional Court has dealt with the application of international law during its first
decade. It attempts to add a critical note to the overwhelmingly positive attention the Court has thus
far received internationally. There is no doubt that the inspiration that the Court has thus far drawn
from international (human rights) law is impressive, and in many ways exemplary. Nonetheless,
there is still room for improvement, as the subsequent analysis reveals. In analyzing the Court’s
methodology, this article does not attempt to cover all the jurisprudence of the Court. Instead,
it focuses on a number of selected decisions in different areas of law, which can be regarded as
representative of the manner in which the Court has treated international law over the past decade.

ARTICLES
THE "FRIENDLY BUT CAUTIOUS"
RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:
SOME CRITICAL REMARKS*
Erika de Wet**
INTRODUCTION
On April 27, 1994, a new day dawned in the constitutional
history of South Africa with the enactment of the interim Constitution.' Unlike the earlier Constitutions of 1910, 1961, and
1983, the interim Constitution expressly recognized international law and the role it had to play in municipal law.2 The
provisions in the interim Constitution dealing specifically with
* This Article is based on a commentary the author provided to a presentation by
Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, at a seminar in
Amsterdam on March 7, 2003. This event, which focused on the reception of
international law in the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, was
organized by the Amsterdam Center for International Law in the context of its research
project, Interactions between International Law and National Law, funded by the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. The author would also like to thank
Catherine Br6lmann for comments to an earlier draft.
** Professor of International Constitutional Law, University of Amsterdam, The
Netherlands; Extraordinary Professor, North-West University, South Africa.
1. Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200, 1993, available at
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1993/constitO.html?rebookmark
=1 (last visited March 26, 2005). See, e.g., Dermott J. Devine, The Relationship between
International Law and Municipal Law in the Light of the Interim South African Constitution
1993, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1995); JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW]; John
Dugard, International Human Rights, in RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 171 (Dawid Van Wyk et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter

Dugard, InternationalHuman Rights]; John Dugard, InternationalLaw and the South African Constitution, 8 EUR.J. INT'L L. 77 (1997) [hereinafter Dugard, South African Constitution]; Raylene Keightly, Public InternationalLaw and the Final Constitution, 12 S. AiR. J.
HUM. RTS. 406 (1996); Tiyanjana Maluwa, InternationalHuman Rights Norms and the South
African Interim Constitution, 19 S. AR. Y.B. INT'L L. 29 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of
South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretationof Human Rights Provisions,1 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 176 (1998).
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international law covered the status of customary international
law in South African domestic law,3 the signature and ratification
of international agreements and their application in domestic
law, 4 and the interpretive role of international law.' The final
Constitution of 1996 envisaged only minor changes with respect
to these provisions. 6

Since the time the Constitutional Court began hearing cases
in early 1995, most of the decisions featuring international law
have discussed human rights law.7 Less frequently, the Court has
considered other areas of international law, including international humanitarian law, the law of extradition, and international private law.8 The strong emphasis on international
human rights law is due to the fact that both the interim and
final Constitutions contain a Bill of Rights that guarantees rights
also protected by international human rights treaties.9 Whereas
the interim Constitution was confined largely to civil and political rights, the final Constitution extends its protection to encompass not only civil and political rights but also economic and social rights.' 0 In both instances, great care was taken to ensure
3. S.Amt. INTERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Act 200, 1993), ch. XV, § 231(4).
4. Id. ch. VI, § 82(1)(i); see also id. ch. XV, §§ 231(2), 231(3).
5. Id. ch. III, § 35(1). See also id. ch. VIII, § 116(2) (concerning the Human Rights
Commission); id. ch. XIV, §§ 227(2)(d), 227(2)(e) (concerning the National Defence
Force); see also Keightly, supra note 1, at 406.
6. S.AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108, 1996), ch.
XIV, §§ 231-33, available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html
(last visited March 26, 2005).
7. See Neville Botha, The Role of InternationalLaw in the Development of South African
Common Law, 26 S.AFR.Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 255 (2001) [hereinafter Botha, Role of International Law] ("Virtually all cases before South African courts involving international law,
[sic] have turned on [section 39, "Interpretation of Bill of Rights"] of the Constitution"); see also Pius N. Langa, The Role of the ConstitutionalCourt in the Enforcement and
Protection of Human Rights in South Africa, 41 ST. Louis L.J. 1259, 1269-77 (1997) (discussing human rights decisions of the Court since its inception).
8. See Botha, Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 7, at 255.
9. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

Act 200, 1993), ch. III; see also S. AFR. CONST. ch. II.
10. Compare S. AnR. INTERIM CONST., ch. III ("Fundamental Rights"), with S. AiR.
CONST., ch. II ("Bill of Rights"). See, e.g.,
expanded protections in "Labour Relations"
(compare S.A. INTERIM CONST., ch. IIl, § 27 with S. AFR. CONST., ch. II, § 23); "Property"
(compare S. AFR. INTERIM CONST., ch. III, § 28 with S. AFR.CONST., ch. II, § 25 and addition of S. AFR.CONST., ch. II, §§ 27 ("Health Care, Food Water and Social Security"), 22
("Freedom of Trade, Occupation and Profession"), and 31 ("Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities")).
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that the Bills of Rights complied with international norms,11 in
particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), 12 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 3 Although the
rights are formulated in simpler language than that found in
most human rights conventions, they are broadly modeled on
their international counterparts.1 4 These similarities facilitate
reliance on international human rights standards when interpreting the Bill of Rights.
The strong presence of international human rights law in
the interim and final Constitutions further reflects the historical
context in which the South African Constitution was adopted,
particularly South Africa's indebtedness to international law.' 5
Although the very creation of the country as a free, non-racial,
democratic society was a consequence of internal struggles, 6 this
was motivated very much by universal notions of fundamental
rights and democracy and by the huge support from the international community and international civil society. 7 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid of 1973 ("Apartheid Convention") 8 was
never an important document as an instrument of international
accountability, but from a moral and symbolic point of view, it
was exceptionally important. 9 Together with the Universal Dec-

11. Dugard, South African Constitution, supra note 1, at 84.
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), openedfor signature December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
13. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
14. See HUGH CORDER & LORENS DU PLESSIS, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 47-48, 120-21 (1994).
15. Albie Sachs, Lecture on the Reception of International Law in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Amsterdam (Mar. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Sachs lecture].
16. See Langa, supra note 7, at 1259.
17. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
18. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Jul. 18, 1976, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.
19. See Dugard, InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 1, at 181 ("No prosecutions
have been instituted under [the International Convention on the Supression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid]. In practice its effect has therefore been entirely
symbolic.").
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laration of Human Rights of 1948 ("UDHR") ,2 ° it was always a
standard to which those involved in the struggle aspired and in
this fashion it played an important role in the creation of a coun21
try called South Africa.
It is fair to say that the national and international elements
of the struggle against apartheid shared the notion of a common
set of principles that were recognized by the international community and which were defied by apartheid, both by its very nature and in the methods it used for its perpetuation. 22 International law was seen as the progressive "other" of Apartheid: the
adequate, civilized, and principled response to all the illegalities
and indignities that resulted from systematic racial discrimination. 2' This historical perspective significantly affected the position of international law in the current South African constitu24
tional order.
As indicated above, an examination of the text of the Bill of
Rights reflects a number of provisions that show the significance
of international law for the Constitution.2 5 Some of them deal
very directly with the relationship between what one might call
the legal regime of international law and the constitutional legal
regime of South Africa as a sovereign State. 26 These direct references include the clauses regulating the position of treaties,
which only become part of South African law once they are ratified and incorporated by means of legislation. 27 Self-executing
treaties pose an exception in this regard, as they become auto20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
21. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
22. See id.
23. See Brice Dickson, Aspects of Human Rights Implementation: Protecting Human
Rights Through a ConstitutionalCourt: The Case of South Africa, 66 FolDIr~A L. REv. 531,
537 (1997).
24. Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
25. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
26. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
27. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Af-

rica Act 200, 1993), ch. XV, § 231(3); S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 108, 1996), ch. XIV, § 231(4); see also Neville Botha, Treaty Making in
South Africa: A Reassessment, 25 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 73-81 (2000); Neville Botha,
InternationalLaw in South African Courts, 24 S. AER. Y.B. INT'L L. 330, 334-37 (1999). See
generally Neville Botha, Incorporation of Treaties Under the Interim Constitution: A Pattern
Emerges?, 20 S. AwR. Y.B. ITrr'L L. 196 (1995).
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matically operational once ratified.28 Customary international
law is automatically part of South African law, unless it is incompatible with the Constitution or national legislation. 29
When the clauses referring to the status of treaty and custom in national law are read literally, they presuppose the possibility of a sharp conflict between the international and national
legal orders if the legislature did not legislate to make treaties
operative or the legislator legislated to overcome the terms of
customary international law.3 ° That possibility is permitted by
the current constitutional order.3" However, as will be illustrated below, this has not yet resulted in a head-on collision between the two legal regimes in practice and is unlikely to do so in
the future. This is due to the mediating role of the two so-called
interpretation clauses contained in the interim and final Constitutions,2 which have turned out to be of great practical impor3
tance.
The first of these provisions expressly states that in interpreting legislation, an interpretation consistent with international law is to be preferred. 3 ' This gives the Court considerable
scope in reducing a possible conflict between legislation and international law, whether it is customary international law or
treaty law. It presupposes a mediating role rather than a decisional role based on defining limits. 3 41 It does not depart from
the premise that the two legal orders pull in different directions,
as a result of which international law will be overruled by national law or vice versa. Instead, it presupposes that the way the
Court looks at national law will be influenced by South Africa's
international obligations. If it is possible to interpret the national obligations in a manner that is consistent with interna28. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108,
1996), ch. XIV, § 231(4).
29. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200, 1993), ch. XV, § 231 (4); S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 108, 1996), ch. XIV, § 232; see also Botha, Role of InternationalLaw, supra
note 7, at 255-60.
30. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
31. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200, 1993), ch. XV, § 231(4); see also S. AR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108, 1996), ch. XIV, § 232.
32. Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
33. S. AnR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108, 1996),
ch. XIV, § 233.
34. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
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tional law, then it will do so. It is only if the language of the
Constitution or domestic legislation is so powerful as to be impervious to any interpretation compatible with international law
that the Court would have to opt for such an extreme interpretation. 5
Second, the courts are required to pay regard to international law when applying the Bill of Rights. 3 6 In addition, when
interpreting the Bill of Rights, the Court must promote the values of an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom. 37 This has resulted in the Court regularly
resorting to international instruments such as the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 ("European Convention"). 3 The Court generally resorts to these instruments to reinforce its own position on a matter, as these instruments constitute a source of profound values that are compatible with the
whole underlying core of the South African constitutional order.3 9
However, a closer look at the Court's practice reveals that its
methodology can be criticized in some respects. First, there are
questions about the Court's treatment of non-binding human
rights instruments, also known as "soft law." These questions
pertain to the inconsistent (less than thorough) manner in
35. See id.
36. See S. AFR. IN-ERIM CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200, 1993), ch. III, § 35(1); S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa Act 108, 1996), ch. II, § 39(1).
37. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108,
1996), ch. XI, § 39(1). It is also worth noting that section 198 of the final Constitution
lists as one of its "governing principles" that national security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law. See id. ch. XI, § 198. Moreover, the
security services must act and must teach and require their members to act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and
international agreements binding on the Republic. See id. ch. XI, § 199(5). The international law rule against the defense of superior orders is recognized in section 199(6),
which declares that no member of any security service may obey a manifestly illegal
order. Id. ch. XI, § 199(6). Non-South African citizens detained in consequence of an
international armed conflict are to be treated in accordance with the standards of binding international law. The jus ad bellum also receives constitutional recognition in section 200(2), which provides that the defense force has to defend the republic in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use
of force. See id. ch. XI, § 200(2).
38. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
39. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
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which the Court sometimes treats the non-binding human rights
instruments, as well as the de facto hierarchy it attaches to nonbinding human rights instruments at the (potential) expense of
binding human rights instruments. In addition, the Court seems
reluctant to consider international law norms other than those
stemming from international human rights instruments as a
guideline for interpretation in any extensive fashion.4 ° Because
the constitutional obligation to interpret the Bill of Rights (and
legislation in general) in accordance with international law implies the taking into consideration of all relevant international
norms, the question arises why the Court would be so cautious
when resorting to other international law norms as guidelines
for interpretation. 4
As the title indicates, the purpose of this article is to reflect
on the manner in which the Court has dealt with the application
of international law during its first decade. It attempts to add a
critical note to the overwhelmingly positive attention the Court
has thus far received internationally.4 2 There is no doubt that
the inspiration that the Court has thus far drawn from international (human rights) law is impressive, and in many ways exemplary.4 3 Nonetheless, there is still room for improvement, as the
subsequent analysis reveals.4 4 In analyzing the Court's methodology, this article does not attempt to cover all the jurisprudence
of the Court. Instead, it focuses on a number of selected decisions in different areas of law, which can be regarded as representative of the manner in which the Court has treated international law over the past decade.
The analysis first focuses on the Court's handling of international human rights instruments by analyzing two decisions pertaining to public education.4 5 Although this is but one of the
40. Id.
41. See infra Part II(A) for further discussion of this question.
42. See, e.g., Johann Kriegler, The Constitutional Court of South Africa, 36 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 361 (2003).
43. See Albie Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights and the Overlap between Nationaland
InternationalLaw: Four Cases Before the South Africa ConstitutionalCourt, 28 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 432, 455 (2005) [hereinafter Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights]; see also Kate
O'Regan, Human Rights and Democracy: a New Global Debate: Reflections on the First Ten
Years of South Africa's ConstitutionalCourt, 32 INT'LJ. OF LEGAL INFO. 200 (2004); Johann
Kriegler, The ConstitutionalCourt of South Africa, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 361 (2003).
44. See infra Parts I(C) and 11(D).
45. The analysis focuses on the Constitutional Court's decisions in Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the School Education Bill of 1995,
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many areas in which the Court has applied international human
rights instruments, the two cases in question are arguably very
illuminating of the Court's methodology pertaining to human
rights questions in general.4 6 Thereafter, the Article turns to
other areas of international law that have come before the
Court.4 7 Since these areas are the most problematic in terms of

"international law methodology," the analysis covers the relevant
case law more comprehensively and analyzes four cases ranging
from international humanitarian law to child abduction and extradition.4 8
I. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. The Language Rights of Minorities
In April 1996, the Court had to decide whether an education bill proposed by the Provincial Government of Gauteng violated section 32(c) of the interim Constitution, according to
which everyone had the right to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language, or
religion, provided there is no discrimination on the ground of
race.

49

Certain members of the Afrikaans speaking community disputed clause 19 of the Bill, which prohibited language competence testing as an admission requirement to a public school.5"
They contended that it would violate section 32(c), because the
latter created an obligation on the State to establish schools
based on a common language and culture. 5 Had the Court accepted this argument, it would have implied that black children
who wanted to attend Afrikaans schools would have been ac1995 (39) SA 95 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/gauteng/gauteng.
pdf (last visited March 26, 2005), and Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of
Education, 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/christianedu/christianedu.pdf (last visited March 11, 2005).
46. See infra Part I(C).
47. See infra Part I.
48. Id.
49. Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the School
Education Bill of 1995, 1995 (39) SA 95 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/
files/gauteng/gauteng.pdf (last visited March 11, 2005) [hereinafter Gauteng Education Bill].
50. Id. 3.
51. Id. 5.
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cepted only if they were willing to be educated in Afrikaans.5 2
The case brought to the fore tensions in a society recognizing the growing support for (linguistic) diversity as a value in
itself and the need for equal access to education.5" In South Africa, one had to balance the sustaining of Afrikaans as a linguistic treasure of significant importance to the society's identity,
with the fact that well-resourced single medium schools established in the Apartheid era and controlled by whites for whites
only, were seen as fortresses from which black children were excluded.5 4 In addition, the matter was complicated by the fact
that the white minority government in South Africa had for
many years asserted its claim for control by relying on minority
rights and the increasing recognition of these rights throughout
the world.5 5 To the majority of South Africans, this claim was
deeply flawed, as it prevented them from exercising their fundamental rights, including equal access to education.5 6
The Court came to the conclusion that the wording of section 32(c) did not support a construction obliging the State to
establish schools based on a common language and culture. 57 It
merely allowed for the founding of private schools for this purpose. 5' The Court conceded that where a significant number of
persons would demand instruction in their mother tongue, the
State would be obliged to accommodate them.5 9 This resulted
from section 32(b) of the interim Constitution, which guaranteed instruction in the language of the person's choice where
this was reasonably practical. 60 However, this guarantee would
not imply an obligation to provide separate institutions to this
effect.6 1 It could, for example, also be done by means of bilingual educational facilities within the same institution.
Although the majority of the Court found that a sufficient
answer could be given simply in terms of a textual analysis of the
Constitution, the separate opinion of Justice Sachs included a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See generally Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49.
See id.
See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
See Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49,
7, 11.
Id. 11.
Id.
Id. 6.

61. Id.

7, 11.
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survey of international instruments pertaining to minority
rights. 6 2 Justice Sachs submitted that the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights both focused
on human rights for individuals and not on protection for minorities.6" He also referred to Article 27 of the ICCPR as the first
international norm dealing specifically with rights for ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups that were capable of, and intended
for, universal application.6 4 He regarded Article 27-at its
strongest-as a framework measure with an incipient or embryonic State obligation to pay regard to the needs of cultural, linguistic, and religious minorities.6 5 It would not, however, support a reading implying a State duty to establish separate
schools.6 6
Justice Sachs argued that most human rights instruments on
the subject limited the positive State obligation to provide educa67
tional institutions to groups that have been disadvantaged.
Since Afrikaans community groups did not constitute such a disadvantaged group, but to the contrary had exclusive access to
affluent schools, claims to have the State subsidize these privi-

leges were weak.6 8 He referred especially to Articles 1(4) and 2
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination ("CEARD") of 1964.69 He further sub62. Id. 11 69-89.
63. Id. 59.
64. Id. 60. See ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 27 ("In those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.").
65. See Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49, 1 65.
66. Id. I9 59-65.
67. Id. 1 66.
68. Id. 1 83.
69. Id. 1 82-83. See also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (CEARD), G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 UN GAOR Supp.
(No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,
1969). Article 1(4) of CEARD reads as follows: "Special measures taken for the sole
purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to such groups
or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms
shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial
groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved." Id. According to Article 2(2), "States parties shall, when the
circumstances so warrant, take in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special
and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain
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mitted that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960 similarly did not impose any State obligation to establish separate minority schools.7 ° Finally he
underpinned his argument by referring to the Belgian linguistic
case 7 1 of the European Court of Human Rights (the "European
Court"). Justice Sachs concluded his survey of international law
with a reference to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities ("Framework Convention).72 He
stated that this instrument, which he described as the most advanced international instrument on the subject available to him,
also merely confirmed the freedom to set up educational institutions in a minority language.7 3
In essence, the tenor of his separate opinion indicated that,
if and to the extent that international law obliged States to provide for educational facilities for minorities, this obligation was
aimed at groups that were marginalized, repressed, and underresourced, which was not the case with the Afrikaans speaking
74
community.
B. The Abolition of CorporalPunishment in Public Education
The ChristianEducation case forms a more recent example
in which the Court relied on international law in underpinning
racial groups or individuals belonging to them for the purposes of guaranteeing them
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have
been achieved." Id.
70. See Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49, 84.
71. Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, 1 E.H.R.R. 252 (1979-80). In this case an obligation on the State to
provide educational facilities in minority languages was denied. The decision concerned the first Protocol to the European Convention which provides in part that "no
person shall be denied the right to education." Id. at 253. The European Court opined
that in the light of the negative formulation of the right, children did not have the right
to be educated in the language of their parents by the public authorities or with their
aid. See id.; see also Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49,
84.
72. See Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1,
1998, E.T.S. No. 157, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm (last visited March 11, 2005); see also Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49,
88-89.
73. Id.
74. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
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its conclusion.7 5 In this particular case, the consultation of international human rights law was not limited to a separate opinion,
but it provided a legal backdrop that was integral to the work of
the Court as a whole.7 6
In this instance, the Court considered an American-based
church group that established schools in South Africa during the
1980s on the principle that the Bible deemed corporal punishment as a necessary form of discipline for children.7 7 The issue
in question was whether the prohibition of corporal punishment
in all schools, as prescribed by section 10 of the South African
Schools Act of 1996, violated the constitutional right to religious
freedom of parents who, in accordance with their religious convictions, had consented to the corporal punishment of their chil78
dren by teachers.
The case highlighted the complexities involved in considering issues of religion and community organization that people
willingly arrange for themselves. For example, the parents had a
general interest in managing their lives in a community setting
according to their religious beliefs and a more specific interest
in directing the education of their children. 79 Furthermore, the
child that was at the center of the inquiry was a participant in a
religious community that sought to enjoy such freedom. s Nevertheless, that same child was entitled to constitutional protection." In addition, the broader community had an interest in
reducing violence wherever possible and in protecting children
2
from harm.
In concluding that the general prohibition of corporal punishment in all schools was a reasonable and proportionate limitation to the exercise of religious freedom, the Court referred to
the obligation in the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child ("CRC") to undertake all appropriate measures to
75. Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education, 2000 (4) SA 757
(CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/christianedu/
christianedu.pdf
(last visited March 11, 2005) [hereinafter Christian Education].
76. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15; see also Christian Education, (4) SA 757 (CC).
77. See Christian Education, (4) SA at 757,
2.
78. See S. AR. CONST. (Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 84,
1996) ch. XV, § 1, ch. XXX, § 1.
79. See Christian Education, (4) SA at 768,
15.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 772,
21.
82. See id. at 768,
15.
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protect a child from violence, injury, or abuse. 3
Furthermore, the Court made reference to Article 5(5) of
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief of 1981,
which states that practices of a religion or belief in which a child
is raised must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or
to his full development.8 4 The Court also made extensive reference to a growing jurisprudence in neighboring countries, as
well as in Europe, that outlaws the use of corporal punishment
in schools.8 5
C. Criticism Pertainingto the Court's Methodology
The main criticism against the Court's treatment of international human rights instruments relates to its treatment of nonbinding international instruments. From the outset, the Court
regarded the "interpretation clauses" to refer to binding as well
as non-binding international instruments.8 6 These would include treaties which South Africa has not or cannot ratify, as well
as so-called "soft law instruments," which are declarations, codes
of practice, or resolutions of the General Assembly which are not
meant for ratification. 7
Although in principle this may be a welcome approach,
there are concerns about the Court's methodology when consulting non-binding instruments as part of its interpretational
endeavor.8 8 As indicated in the Introduction of this piece, this
methodological deficit relates to the lack of thoroughness with
which the Court sometimes treats the non-binding instruments,
as well as the defacto hierarchy it attaches to non-binding instru83. See id. at 787,
40. In essence, the Court determined that the Christian
schools were, save for this one aspect of corporal punishment, not prevented from
maintaining their specific Christian ethos. Id.
84. See Christian Education, (4) SA at 787, 40; see also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982), 21
I.L.M. 205, 208.
85. See Christian Education, (4) SA at 790-92,
43-45; see, e.g., Ex parte AttorneyGeneral, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State, 1991 (3) SA 76
(NmSC); S. v. A Juvenile, 1990 (4) SA 151 (SZ); Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom (1982) 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293.
86. See S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 94 (CC).
87. SeeJean-Marie Henckaerts, Self-Executing Treaties and the Impact of International
Law on National Legal Systems: A Research Guide, 26 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 56, 57 (1998).
88. See Botha, Role ofInternationalLaw, supra note 7, at 259-60.
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ments at the potential expense of binding instruments.89
In the GautengEducation Bill decision, the Court's reference
to the Framework Convention as the latest and most advanced
international minority rights instrument at the time reflected a
lack of awareness of several important developments in the field
of minority rights, at least in the European context.9" The judgment did not reflect the momentum that the issue of minority
rights has gained in Europe since the early 1990s, not in the least
due to developments inthe former Yugoslavia and other Eastern
and Central European countries.9 1
One of the most important unmentioned instruments was
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
which the Council of Europe adopted in 1992 ("the Regional or
Minority Language Charter") .92 This Charter contains detailed
obligations for the promotion of minority languages. 93 For example,under Article 8,the State parties must make minority language facilities ranging from pre-school education to tertiary education available within their respective territories.9" Paragraph
34 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the CSCE
Conference on the Human Dimension of 1990 also contains a
similar obligation.9 5
One could argue that the Regional or Minority Language
Charter was not yet in force and that the CSCE-Declaration had
no binding force at the time of the Court's decision. This argument, however, could also apply to the Framework Convention,
which was not in force at the time of the Court's decision ei89. See id.
90. See Gauteng Education Bill, supra note 49.
91. See, e.g., Julie Mertus, Prospects for National Minorities Under the Dayton Accords:
Lessons from History: The Inter-WarMinorities' Schemes and the "Yugoslav"Nations, 23 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 793, 793 (1998).
92. See 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992,
Euro. T.S. No. 148, art. 8.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the CSCE [Part IV], June 24, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1318 ("Persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and
develop their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their
will. In particular, they have the right to use freely their mother tongue in private as
well as in public.").
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ther. 96 Moreover, none of the European regional instrumentsbe they in force or not-could ever be binding on South Af97
rica.
Therefore, if the Court is to use European instruments as a
guideline, it should be done in a consistent and comprehensive
manner. It is also important to note that the Gauteng Education
Bill decision did not make any reference to the African Charter
of Human and People's Rights ("the African Charter"), which
was already ratified by South Africa in 1996 and which guarantees individuals the right to education in Article 17.8
Thus, inquiry into whether this right might include an obligation to provide educational facilities in minority languages
would have been appropriate. Such an argument might have
been construable with reference to Article 17(3) of the African
Charter that requires the State to promote and protect the
morals and traditional values recognized by the community.9 9
This latter point underscores the second criticism of the
Court's methodology in dealing with soft law, namely the hierarchically superior position it places on non-binding instruments
at the expense of binding instruments, most notably, the African
Charter. ' The GautengEducation Bill decision gives some indication of how European human rights instruments have claimed
a de facto special status in the jurisprudence of the Court.10 '
Because these European agreements constitute regional instruments to which South Africa cannot be a party, they should,
strictly speaking, take second place to international and regional
1 2
human rights instruments to which South Africa is a party.
Nevertheless, the reality is that the Court's decisions generally
96. See Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1,
1998, E.T.S. No. 157, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm (last visited March 11, 2005).
97. See Botha, supra note 29, at 257.
98. SeeAfrican Charter, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M.
58, 61, art. 17(1) (1982) (entered into force October 21, 1986).
99. See id. at 61, art. 17(3). Ultimately, however, it is highly unlikely that Article 17
provides the individual with any positive claim against the State. SeeJ. Oloka-Onyango,
Human Rights And SustainableDevelopment In Contemporary Africa: A New Dawn, Or Retreating Horizons?, 6 BuF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 39, 60 (2000); see also Michael Garcia
Bochenek, Compensation ForHuman Rights Abuses In Zimbabwe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.

REV. 483,
100.
101.
102.

533-34 n.196 (1994-1995).
See Botha, supra note 29, at 257.
See generally Gauteng Bill Decision, 1996 (39) SA 95 (CC).
See, e.g., Botha, Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 7, at 257.
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do not reflect an awareness of this distinction.1 °3 While it regularly makes extensive references to the European Convention in
particular, the Court only rarely mentions the African Charter or
10 4
other relevant African soft-law instruments.
This trend was reaffirmed by the Christian Education decision.1 0 5 While referencing applicable jurisprudence pertaining
to the European Convention, the Court made no mention of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child of
1999.106 In the present context, Articles XI(4) and XI(5) of this

unmentioned charter are of particular interest. 10 7 Whereas the
former guarantees the rights of parents to ensure the religious
and moral education of the child in a manner consistent with
the child's evolving capacities, the latter requires the State to ensure that parental or educational disciplinary measures conform
10 8
to notions of humanity and inherent dignity.
These two clauses would seem to illustrate finely the challenge which the Court confronted in the ChristianEducationcase,
specifically, the reconciling of religious rights of parents and the
protection of children against harm. 10 9 By also referring to Articles XI(4) and XI(5) in its judgment, the Court would have contributed to the development of an African regional human rights
instrument and also strengthened the notion of human rights as
a true African value. 1
The Court's affinity for the European Convention could be
explained by the fact that the individual complaints procedure
under it is elaborate and has produced an extensive jurispru103. See id.
104. See id. at 256-57.
105. See Christian Education, (4) SA at 790-92, 43-45; see also African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into
force Nov. 29, 1999, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/A.%20C.%200N%20THE%20RIGHT%20AND%
20WELF%200F%20CHILD.pdf (last visited March 11, 2005).
106. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/24.9/49, Art. XI(4), XI(5), available at http://www.africa-union.org/Officialdocuments/Treaties-%20Conventions-%20Protocols/A. %20C.%200N%20THE%20
RIGHT%20AND%20WELF%200F%20CHILD.pdf (last visited March 26, 2005).
107. See id.
108. See generally Christian Education, 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).
109. See id.
110. See also Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child, July 20,
1979, AHG/St.4 (XVI) Rev. 1 1979 available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr.docs/african/docs/ahsg/ahsg36.doc (last visited March 11, 2005).
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dence to which common law-trained judges eagerly turn for guidance."' Since the complaints procedure of the African Charter and other African human rights instruments are not yet as
well developed and their decisions are not as readily
available,
112
the same judges tend to neglect these instruments.
Nonetheless, this should not lead to the neglect of regional
human rights instruments to which South Africa can be, and in
the meantime has become a party, nor of other African human
rights instruments, which could serve as guidance for interpretation. By relying on the European Convention to the exclusion of
applicable African instruments, the Court entrenches the image
of human rights as being a set of primarily Western values that
are being imposed on African societies." 3 It could also give the
impression that the African human rights instruments are considered inferior to the other mentioned instruments." 4
It should be emphasized that these critical remarks are not
directed at the fact that the Court relies on non-binding international or European instruments when formulating its human
rights jurisprudence, as the depth that this broad approach has
contributed to the Court's human rights jurisprudence is not disputed. For example, it is by now well-known that in the area of
economic and social rights, the Court inter alia underpinned the
enforceability of the constitutional rights to housing and health
with extensive references to certain General Comments adopted
by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 5 In addition, the criticism should not be understood as implying that the outcome of the GautengEducation Bill
decision or the Christian Education South Africa decision were
wrong, or would necessarily have been different, had the Court
indeed taken into consideration all the relevant international instruments.
Instead, the criticism voiced here is aimed at nurturing a
jurisprudence that treats the compatible and overlapping values
111. See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 679, n.115 (2004).
112. See id. at 694-95.
113. See, e.g., Botha, Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 7, at 259-60.
114. See id.
115. See Grootboom v. Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC); see alsoJoan Fitzpatrick & Ron C. Slye, Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom
and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 97 AM. Soc. INT'L L. 669 (2003).
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to be found in international human rights law, on the one hand,
and the South African Constitution, on the other hand, in an
intellectually convincing fashion. In the absence of a methodology that reflects a uniform and consistent strategy as to which
international instruments to consider as (hierarchically superior) interpretation guidelines, there is a distinct danger that the
judges may be perceived as picking amongst those international
human rights instruments which are closest to their own personal views and in accordance with the political mood of the day,
as opposed to drawing from a value system that is entirely consonant with the South African constitutional order. In addition,
there is the risk that African human rights instruments would be
side-lined and the perception entrenched that human rights
norms constitute a mere by-product of western imperialism.
II. INTERPRETATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OTHER
AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. InternationalHumanitarianLaw
One of the first cases the Court had to deal with after taking
up its work in 1995 concerned the constitutionality of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.1 1 6 This Commission was set up
to deal with crimes committed during the era of Apartheid.1 1 7
In its terms of reference it was awarded the power to grant amnesty under certain conditions to individuals responsible for violations of human rights. 18 Some of the members of families
who had lost persons close to them to the death and torture
squads of the Apartheid regime challenged the constitutionality
of the law, which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.11 9 The case came to be known as the Azapo case, referring to an organization that was set up in the late period of the
struggle against Apartheid.1 2 1 It claimed that the provision of
116. See Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) v. President of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC); see also Aeyal M. Gross, The Constitution, Reconciliation and TransitionalJustice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 STA ,. J. INT'L L. 47, 6977 (2004) (discussing the mandate and operations of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
117. See The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 (1995),
available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm (last visited March 26, 2005)
(establishing and describing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
118. See id.
119. See Azapo, (4) SA 671 (CC),
6.
120. See generally id.
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the law granting amnesty was inconsistent with a provision in the
interim Constitution according to which everybody has the right
to have disputes settled in a fair trial in an open court.'2 1
This Constitutional provision had to be read in the light of
South Africa's international obligations pertaining to international humanitarian law, which, according to the Azapo decision,
amounted to a duty to prosecute persons guilty of crimes against
humanity.' 2 2 In the alternative, they claimed that, at the very
least, claims for civil damages should not be expunged by the
amnesty regulation. 2 The case attracted a lot of national and
international attention and clearly was extremely important as
far as the functioning of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was concerned. 124 This placed the Court under significant
time pressure, as its ruling would be determinative for the functioning of another body (the Truth and Reconciliation Commis121. See id. 8.
122. Although South Africa is a party to the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the
four Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War of 1949 (the Geneva Conventions), these
instruments were never transformed into municipal law during the Apartheid era.
Moreover, South Africa refused to sign the 1977 Additional Protocols relating to the
Protection of Victims of International and Non-International Armed Conflicts (i.e., Protocols I and II). The principal reason for this refusal was Protocol I's extension of the
application of the Geneva Convention of 1949 to "armed conflicts in which people are
fighting against . . . racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination,"
which the Apartheid government correctly saw as directed at itself. See Additional Protocols relating to the Protection of Victims of International and Non-International
Armed Conflicts, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/geneva
conventions?OpenDocument (last visited March 26, 2005); see also Dugard, South African Constitution, supra note 1, 86; JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands, eds., 2003); FLORIAN KUTZ, AMNESTIE FOR POLITISCHE
STRAFrATER IN SUDAFRIKA: VON DER SHARPEVILLE-AMNESTIE

BIS ZU DEN VERFAHREN DER

WAHNREITS- UND VERS6HNUGSKOMMISSION (2001); John Dugard, South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Process and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L.

254 (1999); Angelo Gitti, Impunity under National Law and Accountability under International Human Rights Law: Has the Time of a Duty to Prosecute Come?, 9 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
64 (1999); Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 713-17 (1997); Juan E. Mendez, Accountability of PastAbuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 273 (1997); Louis G. Maresca, The Prosecutorv.
Tadic: the Appellate Decision of the ICTY and Internal Violations of HumanitarianLaw as
International Crimes, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 9 (1996); Theodor Meron, International
CriminalizationofinternalAtrocities, 89 AJ.I.L. 554, 561 (1995); Geoffrey R. Watson, The
HumanitarianLaw of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal:Jurisdictionin Prosecutorv. Tadic,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 709 (1996).
123. Azapo, (4) SA 671 (CC),
25.
124. See, e.g., Mathatha Tsedu, Questioning If Guilt Without Punishment Will Lead to
Reconciliation, 53 NIEMAN REP. 220 (1999).
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sion) set up under constitutional provisions.1
The Court essentially decided that the so-called post-amble
to the interim Constitution required that amnesty be granted to
persons who had violated the law in the course of the conflicts of
the past and allowed for the modalities to be established by national legislation. 12 6 Essentially, the Constitutional terms were
conclusive of the matter to the extent that they presupposed full
amnesty to be given. 127 The Court doubted whether the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 were relevant, since it regarded the obligation to prosecute those guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva
1 28
Conventions applicable only to international armed conflict.
The Court also submitted that neither of the two Additional Protocols to these Conventions was applicable, since they were never
signed or ratified by South Africa. 129 Consequently, there was
nothing in the Reconciliation Act that constituted a breach of
the obligations of South Africa in terms of the instruments of
international law, as relied on by the applicants. 3 0
Implicit in the Court's decision was also the assumption that
the potential customary status of international law norms relevant to the question before it was too imprecise to overcome the
strong language of the amnesty.1 3 ' Language, which indicated
that in order to reveal the truth, effect closure, and protect the
new democratic government from huge economic liability for
the crimes of the previous government, there should be indemnity both from civil and criminal liability for the perpetrators of
2
Apartheid crimes.'1
B. Child Abduction
In the more recent case of Sonderup v. Tondelli,133 the Court
was confronted with an apparent clash between the provisions of
the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
125. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
126. Azapo, (4) SA 671 (CC), 1 7.
127. See id. 9.
128. Id. 30.
129. Id.
29.
130. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
131. See Azapo, (4) SA 671 (CC),
34.
132. Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
133. Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/sonderup/sonderup.pdf (last visited March 26, 2005).
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Abduction ("Hague Convention")' 3 4 and Article 28(2) of the final Constitution, which specifies that a child's best interests are
of paramount importance in every matter concerning the
child.1 5 The case concerned a custody dispute between a South
African mother and her former Italian husband, who were both
based in British Columbia, Canada.' 3 6 In accordance with a Canadian court order, the mother was not allowed to remove the
child from Canada without the consent of the father.' 3 7 The
court order did, however, permit her to take the child on a
yearly month-long holiday to South Africa, with the understanding that the child would be returned to Canada after this period.1 3 8 When the mother refused to honor this commitment on
the expiration of the holiday period, the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a court order mandating that the child be
returned to Canada, where any future custody questions would
be determined. 13 ' This court order was initiated under the
terms of the Hague Convention, which provides a mandatory return procedure whenever a child has been removed or retained
in breach of the rights of custody of any person or institution
under the law of the State in which the child habitually resided. 4 The court order was then transmitted to the Eastern
Cape High Court, the South African court that had jurisdiction
in the area where the mother and child resided at the time,
which subsequently determined it to be consistent with the best
interests of the child to be returned to Canada. 4 '
The constitutionality of this decision was then challenged by
the mother on the basis that a return to Canada would not serve
the best interests of the child, as demanded by Article 28(2) of
the final Constitution. 4 2 The Council for Ms. Sonderup claimed
134. The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects in International Child Abduction,
opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980), availableat http://travel.state.gov/family/abduction/
hague issues/hagueissues_565.html (last visited March 26, 2005) [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
135. S. AR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108, 1996),
ch. II, § 28(2).
136. See Sonderup, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), 1 1.
137. See id. 6.
138. See id. I1 6-7.
139. See id. 1 8.
140. See id. 1 2.
141. See id. 1 16.
142. See id. 1 17.
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that the father was abusive toward the mother and that the interests of the child would be better served if she remained in South
Africa.' 4 3 The question arose whether this constitutional provision conflicted with the mandatory provisions of the Hague Convention demanding respect for foreign court orders and the ju1 44
risdictional primacy of the foreign court in matters of custody.
The question thus arose whether there was a conflict between
the constitutional obligation to serve the best interests of the
child at all times and international obligations aimed at guaranteeing respect for the rule of law and comity between nations in
4
matters pertaining to child abduction.1 1
In considering this matter, the Court paid particular attention to an exception to the mandatory return procedure provided for in Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. 14 In accordance with this clause, the judicial authority in the requested
State was not bound to order the return of the child where there
was a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or
psychological harm on his or her return, or otherwise be placed
in an intolerable situation.' 4 7 In interpreting this exception, the
Court determined that evaluating the best interests of the child
required considering situations where not only the child but also
the mother would be threatened with abuse were she to accompany the child on his or her return to the foreign jurisdiction.1 4
It regarded this interpretation as necessary to find a balance between the essence of the obligations of the Hague Convention
(i.e., rapid response to court orders of foreign courts) and core
values of the final Constitution.1 4 9
The Court was, however, unwilling to interpret the exception provided in Article 13(b) in a way that granted a fresh inquiry by a South African court into the question of whether the
short-term interests of the child would be served best if he or she
143. See id. 38.
144. See id. 1 10, 33.
145. See id.; see also Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
146. See Sonderup, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC),
11-12.
147. See id. 38.
148. See id. 34.
149. The court did not find that, on the evidence of the case, there was any real
physical threat towards the child or the mother. As far as the latter was concerned,
there was no evidence indicating that she would have to have any contact with the
father on her return. See id. 47.

2005]

"FRIENDLY BUT CA UTIO US" RECEPTION

1551

remained in South Africa at that point in time. 150 According to
the Court, the long-term interests of having the custody questions decided by the court in which the child had his or her habitual residence overrode the short-term interests.1 5 1 Any other
interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Hague Convention by effectively transferring jurisdiction in custody matters
from the Canadian Court to the South African Eastern Cape
High Court. While the overriding of the short-term interests resulted in a limitation of the rights of the child in Article 28(2) of
the final Constitution, this limitation was reasonable and justifia15 2
ble in an open and democratic society.
The Court thus reconciled the regime of the Hague Convention with the final Constitution by narrowly interpreting the
exception provided in Article 13(b) as referring to physical and
psychological harm of a serious nature only.151 While the Constitution demanded an interpretation that gave due consideration to the consequences of a threat of physical violence to both
mother and child, it did not require a broader interpretation
that placed strong emphasis on the short-term interests of the
154
child.
C. Extradition and Deportation
On a number of occasions, the Court has been called on to
deal with cross-frontier relationships in the form of extradition
and deportation. This series of cases was triggered by the case of
Jfirgen Harksen, who was involved in extensive litigation before
the South African courts in an attempt to prevent his extradition
to Germany, where he was charged with fraud. 155 One of the
issues central to the dispute was whether ad hoc extradition in
terms of Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act1 56 should also comply with the constitutional prerequisites for an international
150. See id. 29.
151. See id.
152. See S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108,
1996), ch. II, § 36(1) (Limitation of rights); see also Sonderup, (1) SA 1171 (CC),
35.
153. See Sonderup, (1) SA 1171 (CC),
44 (internal quotations ommitted).
154. See id.
44-48.
155. See Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2000 (2)
SA 825 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/harksen2/harksen2.pdf
(last visited March 11, 2005).
156. Extradition Act 67 of 1962, available at http://www.info.gov.za/acts/1996/
a77-96.htm (last visited March 11, 2005). Section 3(2) deals with extradition to coun-
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agreement. The question arose, in particular, whether the signature of the South African president to a statement that permitted the extradition of Harksen to Germany constituted an international agreement.1 5 7 If this were the case, the extradition
"agreement" would only become operative once it was ratified by
Parliament.
In March 1994, the South African government received a
request from Germany for Harksen's extradition. South Africa
had not concluded an extradition agreement with Germany, and
a series of diplomatic notes dealing with Harksen's extradition
was exchanged between the German and South African governments through the Department of Foreign Affairs. 5 8 The president subsequently granted his consent to extradite Harksen on
the basis of Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act. 59 Counsel for
Harksen argued that this consent of the president constituted an
international agreement, which contravened the provisions of
Article 231 of the interim Constitution, 6 ' as it bypassed the prescribed procedures requiring parliamentary involvement. 6 '
The Court rejected this argument on the basis that although Section 3(2) might eventually have international resonance, the Extradition Act governed applications for extradition on the domestic plane. 6 2 As a result, the decision to extradite in terms of
Section 3(2) was never more than a domestic act implying that
in accordance with South African domestic law, Harksen could
be brought before a magistrate's court in order to initiate the
63
extradition proceedings.'
From the perspective of international law, it is interesting to
note that Harksen further submitted an argument based on estoppel.' 6 4 It was argued on his behalf that by exercising consent
tries with which South Africa has not concluded an extradition agreement. See id.

§ 3(2).
157. Harksen, (2) SA 825 (CC),
13.
158. For a summary of the facts, see JMT Laubschagne & Mich4le Olivier, Extradition, Human Rights and the Death Penalty: Observations on the Process of Internationalisationof
CriminalJustice Values, 28 S.AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 149 (2003).
159. See Harksen, (2) SA 825 (CC), 7 7.
160. See id. 77 15-17.
161. See id. 15.
162. Id. 14.
163. See id. 21.
164. See id. 24; see also Neville Botha, Lessons from Harksen: a Closer Look at the
Constitutionalityof Extradition in South African Law, 33 COMP. & INT'L LJ. OF S.AFR. 297
(2000).
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in terms of Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act, the president
created the impression that he was entering into an international agreement. 16 Once Germany had been informed of this,
it was entitled to rely on such consent. 166 The fact that the
agreement was not binding in terms of the Constitution would
be irrelevant from the German point of view.16 7 Counsel for
Harksen supported this argument with reference to Article
46(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
("Vienna Convention"), 16 which determines that a State may
not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
169
been expressed in violation of a provision of its national law.
The Court was reluctant to accept this argument, pointing to the
fact that the extent to which the Vienna Convention reflects customary international law was by no means settled.1 7 ° It also
noted obiter dictum that Article 46(1) provided two exceptions to
a State being bound by consent in violation of its national law,
namely in cases of violations that were manifest and involved a
domestic rule of fundamental importance.1 7 1 It noted that it was
unlikely that an international agreement entered into in breach
of the provisions of a national constitution that governed international agreements would constitute anything but a "manifest
violation" concerning a law of "fundamental" importance. 172
However, the Court also stressed that it preferred to leave open
the interpretation and binding effect of Article 46(1), as this was
not necessary to decide the case. 17 3 The Court regarded as decisive the fact that the president's acts under Article 3(2) of the
Extradition Act were domestic rather than international and that
the South African and German authorities showed no evidence
1 4
of an intention to enter into an international agreement.
13.
165. See Harksen, (2) SA 825 (CC),
166. See id. 24.
167. See id.
168. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
169. See id. art. 46(1) ("A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound
by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.").
26.
170. See Harksen, (2) SA 825 (CC),
171. Id.
172. Id. 27.
173. Id.
174. See id. 1 28; see also Botha, supra note 7, at 297.
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A more dramatic extradition case was that of Mohamed,
one of four men on trial in a United States federal court on various charges carrying the death penalty, stemming from the
bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7, 1998.175 Mohamed, a Tanzanian national,
came to South Africa after the bombing and lived in Cape Town
under a false name. 1 76 In a collaborative act between South African and United States intelligence authorities, Mohamed was arrested in Cape Town in October 1999 and deported to New York
for murder with the possibility
where he subsequently stood trial
1 77
penalty.
death
the
of receiving
In South Africa, the constitutionality of Mohamed's removal
to the United States was challenged on his behalf by his former
employer, claiming that his rights to life, dignity and freedom
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment in Articles 10
through 12 of the final Constitution had been violated.1 78 When
faced with the issue on appeal, the Court distinguished between
extradition and deportation. 179 It described the former as the
request from one State to another for the delivery of a person,
and the subsequent delivery of that person for trial or sentence
to the requesting State.' 80 Deportation, on the other hand, was
175. See Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) SA 893
(CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/mohamed/mohamed.pdf (last visited March 11, 2005).
176. See id. 17.
177. See generally Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights, supra note 43.
178. The protection of human rights during extradition proceedings also came
under scrutiny in Geukingv. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2003 (3) SA
34 (CC); 2003 (2) BCLR 128 (CC), availableat http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/geuking/geuking.pdf (last visited March 11, 2005). The applicant, inter alia, questioned the
constitutionality of Article 10(2) of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962, claiming an infringement of his constitutional right to a fair public hearing. In terms of Article 10(2), a
magistrate's court shall accept as conclusive proof a certificate issued by the appropriate
authority in charge of prosecution in the State requesting extradition stating that it had
sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of the person concerned. The Court
rejected the applicant's claim, stating that extradition proceedings did not determine
the innocence or guilt of the person concerned, but merely whether there was reason
to remove the person to a foreign State to stand trial. In determining whether a valid
case for extradition existed, the South African Courts could rely on a statement of the
foreign authorities pertaining to the substance of the respective foreign law, as the
courts would otherwise have great difficulty in determining the substance of such law.
See alsoJMT Laubschagne & Mich~le Olivier, supra note 158, 154.
179. See Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) SA 893
(CC),
29.
180. See id.
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a unilateral act by which a State rid itself of an undesirable
alien."' The Court, however, also pointed out that deportation
and extradition could coincide, which could lead to difficulties
in determining the true purpose and nature of the act of delivery.18 2 It concluded that in the South African context, the rights
to human dignity, life, and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment obliged the government not
to participate in any way in the imposition of such punishment,
even outside the borders of South Africa. 183 These obligations
were binding on the government regardless of whether the case
concerned extradition or deportation.1 8 4 Therefore, even if the
State were able to deport Mohamed to the United States, and
even if he had given informed consent to such removal - a fact
that was disputed - the State should have secured an undertaking that he would not be subjected to the imposition of the
85
death penalty.'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court drew its reasoning
from both the Makwanyane decision that outlawed the death
penalty 8 6 as well as international views as reflected in various

international forums. 8 7 In these bodies, a death penalty sentence is not possible.18 8 The Court made specific reference to
Security Council Resolution 827 which, in adopting the Statute
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), is9 expressly stated that the Tribunal should not be
permitted to impose death sentences.'
The Statute of the
181. See id.
182. See id.; see alsoJMT Laubschagne & Michhle Olivier, supra note 158, at 148.
183. See Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC),
38.
184. See id.
185. See id.
43, 46; see alsoJMT Laubschagne & Michhle Olivier, supra note 148,
at 148-149M; Botha, Role of InternationalLaw, supra note 7, at 230.
186. S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391; 1995 (6) BCLR 665, construed in Mohamed,
(3) SA 893 (CC),
39, 40, 48-49, 55.
187. See generally Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC) (including in its analysis, inter alia,
discussions of Germany's abolition of the death penalty, Canadian Supreme Court
holdings, and the European Court of Human Rights).
188. See, e.g., Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 INn. L.J.
7, 8 (1996) (stating that Germany abolished the death penalty in 1949); see also William
A. Schabas, InternationalDecision: United States v. Burns, 95 A.J.I.L. 666, 667 (2001) (stating that Canada, as a matter of national law, abolished the death penalty in 1998).
189. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1186-87 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the ICTY].
190. See Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC),
40 n.30 (stating that "in paragraph 1 of the
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ICTY reaffirmed this obligation in Article 24,191 as the Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had done in Article 23.192 These articles indicated that the international community rejected the death penalty, even when faced with the
most horrendous crimes of a widespread nature. 19 3 The Court
also placed strong reliance on the United Nations Conventions
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984,194 as well as the jurisprudence of
95
the European Court of Human Rights.1
D. Criticism of the Court's Methodology

The main methodological criticism regarding the Court's
modus operandi concerns the limited role the Court attributes to

international law obligations other than those stemming from
international human rights treaties as a guideline for interpretation."' This isreflected by its reluctance to draw from international law sources others than those ratified by South Africa, as
well as its hesitance to examine and apply customary internaresolution [the Security Council] approved the report of the Secretary-General of 3
May 1993 in which he recommended in paragraph 112 that '[t]he International Tribunal should not be empowered to impose the death penalty"').
191. Statute of the ICTY, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), art. 24 available at http://
www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm#24 (last visited June 21, 2005).
192. International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, Statute, S.C. Res. 955, annex, UN SCOR, 49th
Sess., Res. & Dec., at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/50 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1611
(1994).
193. See Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC), 1 40.
194. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 Annex (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984).
195. See Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC),
56-58, 60 (discussing Soering v. United
Kingdom (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439; see also Hilal v United Kingdom (2001) 33 E.H.R.R.
31; Chahal v. United Kingdom (1966) 23 E.H.R.R. 413); Botha, Role of InternationalLaw,
supra note 7, at 257.
196. But see Maragart A. Burnham, Cultivatinga Seedling Charter: South Aftica's Court
Grows Its Constitution, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 29, 34 (1997) ("The Constitution provides
that, in interpreting its Bill of Rights clauses, the Court 'must' consider international
law, and 'may' consider foreign case law. The new Constitutional Court has remained
remarkably faithful to this injunction. In virtually every case it has decided, and on a
wide variety of issues, ranging from jurisdictional matters to substantive law, it has referred both to international and to foreign law.").
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tional law. This is clearly illustrated by the above mentioned
cases pertaining to extradition. In the Harksen case, the Court
side-stepped questions pertaining to the scope of customary law
as codified by Article 46(1) of the Vienna Convention and its
implications for South African law, choosing instead to "leave
open the interpretation and binding effect in [the] law of Article
46 of the Vienna Convention."19' 7 At the same time, the Court
extensively referred to international human rights law instruments in the Mohamed case, 9 ' although this would, strictly speaking, not have been necessary either.'9 9 Moreover, it is questionable whether the obiter dictum statement concerning Article 46(1)
is correct. It seems that the Court defines a violation that is
"manifest" and concerns "a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance"200 from the perspective of the national legal order. However, with regard to Article 46(1) of the Vienna Convention, which governs the relationship between States inter se,
such a violation has to be determined from the perspective of
the international legal order, which would not normally expect
States to be familiar with other States' domestic rules governing
treaty ratification.
Moreover, even in instances where South Africa has ratified
international treaties, the willingness of the Court to assume that
the principles underlying those treaties are consonant with constitutional values seems to be more limited than in the case of
international human rights instruments. For example, the
Court stated in the Azapo decision that the amnesty clause had to
be measured against the interim Constitution and that international law would only be relevant for interpreting the interim
Constitution itself. 201 The Court nonetheless conceded that the
197. Harksen v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2000 (2) SA
825 (CC),
27 available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/harksen2/harksen2.pdf
(last visited March 11, 2005).
198. See generally Mohamed, (3) SA 893 (CC) (discussing whether the arrest and
extradition of an illegal immigrant to the United States violated international laws of
extradition and deportation).
199. The Court has since given some consideration to customary international law
relating to diplomatic protection. See, e.g., Samuel Kaunda v. President of the Republic
of South Africa, Case CCT 23/04 (Aug. 4, 2004); Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights,
supra note 43.
200. Harksen, (2) SA 825, 1 27; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 168, at art.
46(1).
201. Azanian People's Organization (Azapo) v. President of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC),
26-27.
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interim Constitution and other legislation are presumed to be in
accord with international law.2 ° 2 Accordingly, this would require
the Court to first ascertain the rule of international law in a thorough and proper manner and, thereafter, attempt to reconcile it
with the interim Constitution or an act of parliament. Only
when this had been done could the Court consider the question
of consistency. However, the Court appears to have assumed
that international law was irrelevant if it was inconsistent with the
interim Constitution, instead of attempting first to reconcile the
20 3
two before considering the question of inconsistency.
Furthermore, had the Court in the Azapo case engaged in a
more extensive survey of the relevant international practice in
the area, it would have found additional support for its conclusion. For example, according to the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY in the case against Dusko Tadic,2 °4 the Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that acts which must be prosecuted by
states under the rubric of "grave breaches" are only classified as
such if such acts occur against persons or property protected by
the Conventions. 20 5 This is a restrictive definition and does not
include persons participating in, or civilians affected by, an internal conflict. 20 6 The Court could have backed its conclusion by
202. Id. 26.
203. See Dugard, South African Constitution, supra note 1,at 191.
204. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995), reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 32 (1995).
205. See id. 81; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I] ("Grave breaches to which the [Convention] relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful [sic] killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully [sic] causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly");
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva IV].
206. See Maresca, supra note 122, at 220; see also Watson, supra note 122, at 708;
Christopher Greenwood, International HumanitarianLaw and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 265, 275-76 (1996). The Appeals Chamber considered the concept of grave
breaches under the Convention inseparable from the concept of protected persons and
property, and believed that neither concept featured in Common Article 3, the only
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the Tadic decision, but refrained from doing so.
In addition, the Tadic decision provided support for the fact
that an obligation to prosecute for acts committed at the time in
question could not easily be derived from customary law as codified by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.2 " 7 While
the ICTY affirmed that Common Article 3 governed internal
strife and had acquired customary law status,2 °8 violations of
Common Article 3 had, nonetheless, at that point in time, never
been treated as crimes under international law. 2 0 Although violations of Common Article 3 could exist as international offences
subject to universal jurisdiction, they did not yet implicate the
mandatory type of jurisdiction envisioned by the Geneva Conventions.210 The same consideration applied to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.2 1l The ICTY further submitted
that "many" of its provisions would also enjoy some degree of
customary character.21 2 However, the ICTY's reference in this
provision in the Conventions applicable to internal armed conflicts. See Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-AR72, 1 81.
207. See Geneva I, art. 3; Geneva II, art. 3; Geneva III, art. 3; Geneva IV, art. 3
[hereinafter Common Article 3]. Common Article 3 determines, inter alia, that the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited with respect to civilians:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
Id.
208. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 1 98, 103, 109, 116, 134; see also Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, U.N.
Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1163 (1993).
209. See Greenwood, supra note 209, at 279-80; see also Maresca, supra note 122, at
222. The Appeals Chamber also did not exclude the future classification of Common
Article 3 violations as grave breaches, which could arise by the development of autonomous customary rule. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
83. But see id. 134 ("All of
these factors confirm that customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of Common Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and
rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain
fundamental principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil
strife.").
210. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
81.
211. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, reprinted in 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
212. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
117. Cf Roman Boed, Individual Criminal
Responsibility for Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of
Additional Protocol II thereto in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
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regard is rather vague and Additional Protocol II has not generally been regarded as declaratory of customary international
213

law.

A similar conclusion could have been drawn from an inquiry into whether other principles of customary international
law relating to torture, war crimes, and particularly crimes
against humanity, require prosecution of offenders. On the one
hand, Apartheid has been labeled as a crime against humanity
215
by the General Assembly 214 and the Apartheid Convention.
This may suggest a customary international law obligation to
prosecute those who committed the crime of apartheid, particularly with respect to systematic murder, torture, and disappearances, which were all crimes under South African law before
1990.216

However, a survey of State practice at the time would

probably have revealed that State practice was still too uncertain
2 17
and unsettled to support such a rule.
In essence, therefore, a proper interpretation of the amnesty clause, i.e., its interpretation in light of South Africa's international customary obligations, would have added authority
Rwanda, 13 CriM. L.F. 293 (2002); Ian G. Corey, The Fine Line between Policy and Custom:
Prosecutorv. Tadic and the Customary InternationalLaw of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 MIL.
L. REv. 145 (2000).
213. See Greenwood, supra note 209, at 278; see also Maresca, supra note 122. Although the Chamber presented declarations from the United States and El Salvador,
few other States at the time had declarations supporting customary status. This lack of
additional confirmations and the absence of Additional Protocol II in the military
manuals of States undermined the Court's implicit assertion that the Additional Protocol II exists as a customary source of penal rules. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
107, 110.
214. See, e.g., Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res.
39/72, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/72 (1984) (confirming that
Apartheid is a threat to international peace and security).
215. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
216. See Dugard, South African Constitution, supra note 1, at 190-91. A growing
number of authors recognizing an emergence of a customary human rights obligation
that would oblige States to prosecute human rights violations in internal conflicts. See
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
217. See Dugard, South African Constitution, supra note 1, at 191. Relevant case
law already available at the time of the Azapo decision included decisions of the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights involving Uruguay and Argentina. See Case No.
28/92, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 14 (1992); see also Case No. 29/92, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25 (1992);
Velasquez Rodriguez, 95 I.L.R. 259 (1988) (holding that a successor government was
obliged to prosecute those members of the previous government responsible for
human rights violations).
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to the position the Court asserted. The Court's failure to engage
218
in such a process was at least in part due to time constraints.
Although several months had already passed since the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,2 1 9 it could
not start functioning until the Court had ruled on the legality of
the amnesty.2 2° In addition, the language of the Constitution
was explicit, resulting in the Court's inclination towards giving
if this had led to a violation
preference to the Constitution, even
22 1
of international law obligations.
It will be interesting to see whether the Court will be willing
to address the question of an obligation to prosecute certain violations of international humanitarian law in a more comprehensive manner in the Basson case, 222 currently pending before it.
In this case, the Court will have to consider, inter alia, whether
international law places a duty on the State to prosecute acts including the development of toxic chemical and bacterial agents
for purposes of eliminating opponents of the South African government in neighboring countries.2 23
The willingness to place the Constitution above international law was also implied in the Sonderup decision, where the
Court once again reflected a reluctance to ascertain the scope of
the rule of international law in a thorough and proper manner
and then reconciles it with the Constitution.2 2 4 Instead, the
Court effectively followed a reverse approach by emphasizing the
supreme position of the Constitution and then measuring the
relevant provisions of the Hague Convention against the limita218. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
219. The Commission was founded through the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/
act9534.htm (last visited March 26, 2005).
220. See generally Azanian Peoples Organisation (Azapo) v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC).
221. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
222. S. v. Wouter Basson, 2004 (3) SA 30 (CC).
223. In the preliminary judgment, on March 10, 2004, the Court decided that it
had jurisdiction to hear the case, since the issues under consideration were of a constitutional nature. See Sonderup v. Tondelli, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC), available at http://
www.concourt.gov.za/files/sonderup/sonderup.pdf (last visited March 26, 2005). In
his separate opinion, Justice Sachs noticed that if the conduct in question constituted
war crimes, this could impose a special constitutional responsibility on the State to prosecute the respondent. Id. 116; see also Sachs, War, Violence, Human Rights, supra note
46.
27.
224. See Sonderup, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC),
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tion clause.22 5 Moreover, had the Court in the Sonderup decision
engaged in a more thorough analysis of State practice of the interpretation of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention, it would
have found significant support for its own interpretation of this
clause.2 2 6
For example, the German Constitutional Court, when confronted with the challenge of balancing its international obligations under the Hague Convention with the best interest of the
child as guaranteed in the German Grundgesetz,227 determined
that the Hague Convention achieved an unobjectionable balance between the legitimate interests of the parents and the constitutionally-protected best interest of the child, stressing that the
latter must prevail in cases of conflict. 228 As far as the interpretation of Article 13(b) is concerned, the German Constitutional
Court, like its South African counterpart, emphasized that the
defense provided by this clause should only be applied in excep229
tional cases that exceed the normal stress of returning a child.
A cursory survey of United States and Canadian court practices in relation to Article 13(b) at the time of the Sonderup decision also reflects some consistency with the South African Consti225. See id.
226. Note that the Hague Convention does not define what constitutes a grave risk
of physical or psychological hardship or an intolerable situation. At the time the
Sonderup judgement was rendered, none of the decisions of the European Court in
Strasbourg pertaining to the Hague Convention concerned Article 13(b). See Karen
Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failuresof the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L
L. & POL. 285, 325 (2001) ("The Child Abduction Convention does not define what
constitutes a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation.").
227. Grundgesetz (GG), art. 2, 6.
228. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 79, 203 (210); see
also Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, The Futureof the Hague Child Abduction Convention: The Rise
of Domestic and International Tensions - The European Perspective, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 59, 60 (2000) ("In principle, the interests of the child will be served best when he
or she is returned as soon as possible. This applies with regard to the best interests of
the specific child concerned, as well as to the best interests of children in general, and
also with regard to the rules of burden of proof.").
229. BverfGE 43, 405. See also BverfGE 46, 641; Wolfe, supra note 226, at 333 (noting that "the Federal Constitutional Court continues to emphasize that Article 13(b)
defenses are only to be granted in exceptional cases that exceed the normal stress of
returning a child," while "the lower courts continue to give a broad interpretation to
what could cause harm to the child - more in keeping with a best-interests analysis
than a narrow exception to return"); Coester-Waltjen, supra note 228, at 64 (noting that
the German Constitutional Court has found that return orders raised no constitutional
questions even where the abducting parent was the primary caretaker and had to fear
criminal proceedings on return).
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tutional Court. According to some jurisdictions in the United
States, the Article 13(b) exception can only be applied where
the danger exists to the child itself (as opposed to the abducting
or wrongfully retaining parent) and where the State of habitual
residence is unable to provide adequate protection.2 3 ° Otherjurisdictions, however, have regarded the risk of psychological
damage to the child resulting from the physical abuse of the
mother as sufficiently grave to prevent return.2 31 Canadian jurisdictions have also successfully invoked an Article 13(b) defense
based on strong evidence of the risk of abuse of the abducting
mother by the left-behind father on return and the resulting psychological damage to the child.23 2 These cases also reflect the
importance of strong evidence of violent behavior on the part of
the left-behind parent and an inability of the State of habitual
residence to provide adequate protection.2 3
These references to State practice in other jurisdictions thus
reveal that a more thorough review of international practice by
the South African Constitutional Court in Sonderup could have
added depth to its decision. It would arguably have reflected
that its own interpretation of Article 13(2), which succeeded in
finding a balance between an overly conflated interpretation of
this exception and real threats to the child's well-being, finds
230. See, e.g., Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Dalmasso v.
Dalmasso, 269 Kan. 752 (2000); Wolfe, supra note 226, at 326 (noting that "the return
itself must place the child in jeopardy of physical or psychological harm or of an intolerable situation ... the danger to the child must somehow be inherent in that jurisdiction").
231. See, e.g., Krishna v. Krishna, No. C97-0021SC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4706, at
*9-10 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 11, 1997) (holding that an abusive relationship between the
child's parents established "potential for serious psychological harm"); Walsh v. Walsh,
221 F.3d 204, 219 (2000) (holding that the District Court improperly found spousal
abuse insufficient to pose a grave risk of psychological harm to the child). But see Wolfe,
supra note 226, at 326-27 ("Throughout this analysis, the danger must be to the child
and not the abducting or wrongfully retaining parent.").
232. See, e.g., Pollastro v. Pollastro, [1999] D.L.R. 32; P. (N.) v. P. (A), [1999] C.A.
1200; see also Martha Baily, Canada's Implementation of the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects ofInternationalChild Abduction, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 35 (2001) (citing
Pollastroand P. (N.) v. P. (A) as cases "in which an Article 13(b) defense based on evidence of abuse of the abducting mother by the left-behind father were successfully
invoked").
233. See Finizio v. Scoppio-Finizio [1999] 124 O.A.C. 308 (holding that Pollastrowas
an exceptional case and that 13(b) should be interpreted narrowly, with the presumption that the courts of another contracting State are competent to make arrangements
for the child); Baily, supra note 232, at 37 (describing the holding in Finizio).
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resonance in other jurisdictions.23 4
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is fair to say that the Court gives a friendly
but cautious welcome to international law. As far as international human rights instruments are concerned, the Court's willingness to regard international instruments as guidelines for interpretation has been predominantly friendly. It is fair to conclude that it consistently regards international human rights law
as a guiding principle that provides a common substratum to
both the national and international legal orders. In practice the
Court draws heavily on international human rights law, including international "soft law," when interpreting the Bill of Rights
in the Constitution. The Court is not so much interested in the
nature of the source as its underlying principles. These can also
be found in "soft law" instruments, which are progressive and
contemporary and which sometimes provide guidance in areas
23 5
where very little hard law is available.
The above analysis has, however, also illustrated that a word
of caution is called for insofar as non-binding international instruments are sometimes applied inconsistently, in what may
come across as a pick and choose fashion. In addition, these
instruments should not be relied upon at the expense of those
instruments, which South Africa has ratified. This already seems
to be happening, particularly in that the European Convention
is strongly promoted, while the African Charter and other African instruments seem to be neglected. More conceptual clarity
as to the relationship between international binding and nonbinding law in the South African context is therefore necessary.
When it comes to the interpretation of international law instruments that move beyond the boundaries of international
human rights law, the Court's approach becomes much more
cautious. This may relate to the fact that whereas most judges on
234. In Sonderup, the Court suggested that an absence of an equivalent to Article
28(2) of the South African final Constitution in other jurisdictions might require special care to be taken in applying their (possibly too narrow) dicta pertaining to Article
13(b). SeeSonderup v. Tondelli, 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC),
33, available at http://www.
concourt.gov.za/files/sonderip/sonderup.pdf (last visited Ma). Although this is a
valid point, this should not prevent the Court from consulting foreign decisions ab initio.
235. See Sachs lecture, supra note 15.
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the Court have a strong knowledge of international human
rights law, very few have extensive expertise in other areas of international law.2 36 It is arguably this unfamiliarity with a particular branch of law, rather than any deliberate disregard for international law as such, that would be responsible for the Court's
sometimes less-than-thorough surveys of relevant customary or
treaty norms. It could be assumed that this unfamiliarity has its
roots in South Africa's years of isolation and that it will still take
time for South African lawyers and judges to become fully conversant with the sources, rules and reasoning of international
law. That some progress in this regard is gradually being
achieved is evidenced by the recent Kaunda case.2 3 7 In determining whether the State had to prevent the extradition of
South African nationals from Zimbabwe to Equatorial Guinea,
the Court explicitly determined that neither customary international law nor the African Charter obliged the State to grant diplomatic protection to its citizens.23 8
All things considered, the Court has laid important groundwork during the first decade of its existence for enhanced interaction between national and international law. In doing so, it
has become an inspiration to many, both inside and outside of
South Africa, and its vision of the relationship between the two
legal orders continues to provide a welcome alternative to the
predominantly anti-international behavior of its United States
counterpart.

236. See generally Biographies, Constitutional Court Judges, http://www.concourt.
gov.za/judges/index.html.
237. Kaunda, Case CCT 23/04 (2004).
238. In Kaunda, the applicants (alleged mercenaries with South African nationality) wanted to avoid their extradition from Zimbabwe, where they were arrested, to
Equatorial Guinea, where they would be tried for plotting a coup against the government. See id. In determining whether the South African government was obliged to
take steps to prevent their extradition to Equatorial Guinea, the Court explicitly considered whether customary international law obliged the State to grant diplomatic protection to its citizens. See id. It concluded that it did not. The Court also explicitly mentioned that neither the African Charter nor any other human rights instrument granted
an individual right to diplomatic protection. See id. 34.

